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When a city outlaws the most affordable way to earn a living selling food, it 
builds inequity into the local food economy. It holds back people who could sell 
healthy, affordable, innovative, or culturally significant food, but who don’t have 
the budgets to finance brick-and-mortar businesses. It holds back people who could 
create jobs or start businesses that become pillars of the community. It forces small-
budget entrepreneurs to choose between selling against the law at great risk or giving 
up on entrepreneurship because it is unaffordable. 
By removing excessive regulatory barriers to start a pushcart food business, 
reformers expand economic liberty for people. We free them to bring culture, 
cuisine, and commerce to the street corner. We narrow the gap between the shadow 
economy and the formal economy. We allow vendors the dignity of so-called 
legitimacy. 
Or do we? 
 
* Elizabeth Kregor is the Director of the Institute for Justice Clinic on Entrepreneurship (IJ Clinic on 
Entrepreneurship) and a Lecturer at Law at the University of Chicago Law School. This Essay and the 
campaign underpinning it were buoyed, boosted, and balanced by my colleagues at the Institute for 
Justice, particularly Brooke Fallon. Gregg Kettles provided a helpful sounding board in addition to his 
eye-opening scholarship. The participants of the “Establishing Equity in Our Food System” 
Symposium at the University of California, Irvine School of Law provided insight, and support, and 
inspiration. 
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Legalizing an activity is not always freeing it. Legalizing food businesses 
involves regulating them. The new laws may make business harder for vendors than 
it was in the days without legal options. Lawyers and activists who advocate for 
legalization must take care to do more good than harm. 
This Essay presents a case study of a campaign to legalize pushcart food 
vendors in Chicago in order to explore the interaction of law reform and the shadow 
economy. In this Essay, I will introduce the need for expanding economic liberty 
and the challenges of crafting helpful legal reform to structure that liberty when 
regulating rather than deregulating. I will share lessons learned about how to close 
the gap between the informal economy and the formal economy. I will tackle the 
question of how legal advocates for informal entrepreneurs can help, rather than 
hurt, their cause. How can we structure our laws to optimize liberty for new food 
producers? 
In writing this Essay, I aspire to follow closely in the footsteps of Jane Larson’s 
essay Informality, Illegality, and Inequality.1 Larson described the areas known as 
“colonias,” the unregulated settlements outside of Texas cities near the Mexico 
border, where people buy land and build homes with the materials and skills they 
can acquire, and where homes are neither required to comply with a building code 
nor connected to basic physical infrastructure, like water, sewage, and roads.2 
Larson used the colonias as a case study to explain the deep conundrum of the 
informal economy and to propose an approach to legal reform that might be both 
workable for the residents of the colonias and compatible with the lawyerly demand 
for the rule of law.3 Her work did not go so far as to test the practicality of lobbying 
and legislating her proposed reforms into action.4 In this Essay, I will offer a 
corrective based on the case study of the vendors in Chicago and the experiences 
of passing laws through the legislature with the blessing of the Department of Public 
Health. 
While discussing the “informal economy” or “shadow economy,” I will apply 
the definition provided so succinctly by John Cross: “Informal economic activity 
comprises those economic strategies that contravene laws regulating how business 
should be conducted, but not laws specifying what business may be conducted.”5 In 
doing so, I am tracking most scholarship in law and urban planning, but take a 
distinct approach from the highly influential sociological study of the underground 
economy in Chicago, Off the Books by Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh.6 Venkatesh declined 
to demarcate licit and illicit activities in his in-depth investigation of inner-city 
 
1. Jane E. Larson, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137 (2002). 
2. Id. at 140. 
3. Id. at 144. 
4. Id. at 182. 
5. JOHN C. CROSS, INFORMAL POLITICS: STREET VENDORS AND THE STATE IN MEXICO CITY 
29–30 (1998). 
6. SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE 
URBAN POOR (2006). 
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economics.7 Since I am not primarily focused on the relationships among the people 
in these businesses, but their relationships to the law itself, I will make the 
distinction. My task here is to study the merits and techniques behind legalization, 
which will likely be different when legalizing a how than when legalizing a what. 
Like Larson’s, this Essay will struggle with the basic conundrum for American 
lawyers trying to think about the shadow economy. Our fundamental belief that 
everyone should be treated equally under the law is tough to reconcile with our 
belief that poor people should not be punished for meeting their basic needs in an 
honorable but noncompliant way. Institutionalizing a system where the law does 
not apply to all, or accepting laws that are broader than we mean to implement, 
impairs the rule of law. For activists and public interest lawyers taking on the task 
of writing the law, these questions take on an urgency. In this Essay, I hope to give 
my fellow activists some inspiration for how to proceed into the conundrum. 
In Part I, I will provide background on a campaign to legalize vendors in 
Chicago. The campaign was successful in getting a reformed ordinance passed, but 
vendors have not taken advantage of the new license in the first year. In Part II, I 
explore the several reasons why it is important to push to legalize vending. In Part 
III, I look to the other side and examine the arguments against pushing for legal 
regulation of an occupation in the shadow economy. Lastly, in Part IV, I introduce 
strategies aimed at maximizing the benefits of legalization while minimizing the 
costs. 
I. SIDEWALK VENDORS IN CHICAGO 
Until recently, almost all food carts were illegal in Chicago. A vendor could 
get a license to be a peddler selling whole, uncooked fruits and vegetables on the 
go; a produce merchant selling whole, uncooked fruits and vegetables from a 
temporary stand (as long as half the business operations were in an area underserved 
by grocery stores); or a mobile frozen desserts vendor selling packaged frozen 
desserts from a nonmotorized vehicle.8 Since it is illegal to operate a business in 
Chicago without a license,9 the absence of a license category made all other food 
carts illegal.10 
 
7. Id. at 11. 
8. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-8-010, 7-38-130, 7-38-140 (1990) (amended Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2321146&GUID=14EB1A4A-849A 
-4502-B254-E9D19E6EADF0&Options=Advanced&Search= [https://perma.cc/6JML-5X7S] 
(concerning mobile vendors). 
9. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-4-010, -020 (1990). 
10.  Please note that the focus of this Essay is on the legal status of nonmotorized food carts, such 
as old-fashioned pushcarts or bicycle trailers. Food trucks are governed by different laws in Chicago 
and have followed their own twisted history. Trucks can be licensed and operate legally, but there are 
significant restrictions on them. They are not allowed to stay in place more than two hours, and they 
are not allowed to park within 200 feet of a business selling food unless they are at one of a few specially 
designated parking spots for food trucks. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 7-38-115 (1990). The Institute for 
Justice is presently suing the City of Chicago due to the protectionist and unconstitutional proximity 
restriction. Leonor Vivanco, Food Fight, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 2012, 2012 WL 24307804. 
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Chicago was one of the only major cities in the country that banned all food 
carts selling prepared foods on the sidewalks.11 
Notably, food carts are legal on land owned by the Chicago Park District. The 
Park District in Chicago has its own independent governing body.12 It has privatized 
concessions in the parks and beaches, and the private company approves vendors 
of many kinds to operate in the parks (in exchange for a fee and a cut of the 
revenues).13 So a vendor might be perfectly acceptable at the edge of a park, but not 
on the sidewalk that borders the park. 
Nonetheless, there has been an extensive industry of food carts operating in 
Chicago.14 The numbers are uncertain but significant. While food vendors are often 
studied by scholars investigating the shadow economy because they are so visible 
and so exposed to penalties, they are notoriously difficult to count.15 They work 
varied hours and varied days, depending on their customer demand and the 
demands of other obligations.16 They move. They are not registered because there 
is no registry for them. (For all these same reasons, vendors are hard to organize 
for grassroots activism.) Vendors and reporters have estimated 1500 to 2000, but 
the methodology of reaching that number is unclear.17 
Chicago’s vendors are predominantly Mexican immigrants.18 They sell 
traditional Mexican street food, like tamales, elotes, chicharron, and cut fruit dressed 
in lime juice and chili pepper. They are easy to find in Chicago’s neighborhoods 
with significant Mexican populations. They are most dense in the neighborhood of 
Little Village, especially along Twenty-sixth Street.19 Twenty-sixth Street offers a 
literal and figurative taste of Mexico, and the Mayor has lauded the business strip 
 
11. ERIN NORMAN ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, STREETS OF DREAMS: HOW CITIES CAN 
CREATE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY BY KNOCKING DOWN PROTECTIONIST BARRIERS TO STREET 
VENDING 23 (2011). 
12. Concession Program, CHI. PARK DISTRICT, http://www.chicagoparkdistrict.com/doing-
business/concession-program/ [https://perma.cc/CK8Q-ZCM8] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
13. Id. 
14. See Robin Peterson, Taking It to the Streets, IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 23, 2009), http://
inthesetimes.com/article/4911/taking_it_to_the_streets [https://perma.cc/KL9A-ZGHZ]; Aixa 
Velez & Araceli Pedroza, Chicago’s Latino Street Vendors Look for Justice, GAPERS BLOCK (Mar. 19, 
2010), http://gapersblock.com/drivethru/2010/03/19/chicagos_latino_street_vendors_look_for_ 
justice/ [https://perma.cc/LTT2-3HGS]. 
15. Larson, supra note 1, at 158 (“No one can say with certainty how many people work, buy, 
and find shelter within the informal economy in this country.”). 
16. See NORMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 9; Mike Sula, The Great Tamale Migration, CHI. READER, 
Sept. 19, 2013, 2013 WL 34248736. 
17. See, e.g., Hal Dardick, Chicago a Step Closer to Licensing Food Carts, and Some Vendors Happy, 
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-chicago-food-
carts-met-20150916-story.html [https://perma.cc/NF3C-XHWE]. 
18. Michael Lucci & Hilary Gowins, Chicago’s Food-cart Ban Costs Revenue, Jobs, Special Report, 
ILL. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 2015), https://files.illinoispolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Foodcart_Paper1.pdf  [https://perma.cc/BUX9-73TY]. 
19. Fran Spielman, The “2nd Mag Mile”?, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012, 2012 WL 5644145. 
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as the second-highest grossing in sales tax revenues, after the tony Magnificent 
Mile.20 
Not all vendors operating in Chicago’s shadow economy are Mexican 
immigrants,21 and there are certainly many African American vendors who set up 
tables and carts selling food, including a man who has acquired a bit of fame for 
selling Mississippi Delta tamales.22 I am less familiar with their story and their 
experiences. They have not been historically organized as activists for vending rights 
in Chicago, and they were not a part of our legalization campaign in the end. 
The Institute for Justice Clinic on Entrepreneurship and I got involved in a 
campaign to legalize Chicago’s sidewalk vendors in 2011.23 The initial strategy was 
to ride the wave of food truck popularity, but Chicago passed tough, expensive, and 
restrictive laws for food trucks in 2012.24 The Street Vendors Justice Coalition 
(SVJC) came together to push Chicago to be friendlier to vendors. The founding 
members were the IJ Clinic on Entrepreneurship (legal advocates for economic 
liberty), AVA (a vendors association), and representatives from community 
organizations in Little Village.25 The Coalition aimed to change the law and also to 
develop the community resources and infrastructure that would allow vendors to 
comply with likely regulatory requirements.26 
SVJC pursued an incremental approach to reform. Because tamale vendors 
were receiving the most pointed penalties from local police, even arrests, we focused 
on relief for them. We drafted amendments to the code that expanded an existing 
license (changing language that allowed vendors to sell packaged frozen desserts 
that were prepared in a licensed facility to language that allowed vendors to sell 
packaged food that was prepared in a licensed facility), thinking that would be easier 
to pass. Our strategy was reinforced by policy officials who told us that the Health 
Department would not support an ordinance that allowed food preparation—even 
slicing fruit—on the carts. We planned that the next phase of reform would allow 
vendors to prepare food on their carts. 
It took several years to put the fire out for the tamalleros. We waged a multi-
faceted campaign, with outreach (or attempts at outreach) to vendors across the 
city; public relations yielding favorable editorials in major papers and repeated 
coverage in Spanish-language media;27 and a petition signed by thousands and sent 
to City Council in a barrage of emails. We worked steadily with policymakers in the 
 
20. Id.; Ronald Brownstein, Why the Time is Finally Right for “Amnesty,” THE ATLANTIC  
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/why-the-time-is-finally-right-
for-amnesty/439218/  [https://perma.cc/J2R4-4NK4]. 
21. VENKATESH, supra note 6, at 119–20. 
22. Sula, supra note 16. 
23. See Press Release, Inst. for Justice (Aug. 17, 2011). 
24. See Vivanco, supra note 10. 
25. See Our Coalition, STREET VENDORS JUSTICE COALITION, https://streetvendorsjustice. 
org/our-coalition/ [https://perma.cc/B5B6-EGXE] (last visited Sept. 16, 2016). 
26. See id. 
27. See News, STREET VENDORS JUSTICE COALITION, https://streetvendorsjustice.org/
coalitionnews/ [https://perma.cc/YKQ3-E8ZA] (last visited Sept. 16, 2016). 
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Department of Health, pressing the argument that vendors could help ease food 
deserts. We marshaled the city’s many strategic plans related to culture, pedestrian 
life, healthy food, and immigration, as evidence that legalizing vending fit into the 
city’s vision for itself.28 We introduced data that demonstrated sidewalk vendors are 
not an extraordinary health risk29 and that they are a potential source of significant 
tax revenue.30 
The SVJC ordinance was introduced in City Council in May of 2014, but it did 
not get a hearing.31 We were informed by the ordinance’s sponsor that some City 
Council members refused to handle the issue in an election year. It seemed as 
though aldermen did not want to take a public stand on the issue of legalizing 
vendors when voters and donors were most attentive. The ordinance was 
reintroduced in May of 2015 and passed in September.32 In the end, no opponents 
spoke out, and the vote was unanimous.33 Vendors rallied and celebrated in City 
Hall. 
In the months after the ordinance was passed, many vendors have grown 
anxious and discouraged about the law. The law does not allow food preparation 
on the cart, and eloteros and fruteros do not know how to or whether to change the 
way they have always sold their food. Some vendors cannot comply, because they 
do not have access to affordable, nearby licensed kitchens. Others are scared that 
the law will be enforced against license holders in unpredictable ways. Some have 
tried and failed to take the sanitation manager test, which the city has said is required 
for any vendor using a shared kitchen.34 Others had trouble pulling together the 
money for the licenses required for cart and kitchen use, which amounted to nearly 
$1000.35 In the first months after the law went into effect, no licenses were issued.36 
A year later, five licenses had been issued, none to the members of AVA, the 
vendors association in Little Village that led the campaign to create the license.37 
Two years later, there was more hope but still few licenses. The vendors association 
 
28. See STREET VENDORS JUSTICE COALITION, supra note 25. 
29. ANGELA ERICKSON, INST. FOR JUSTICE, STREET EATS, SAFE EATS: HOW FOOD TRUCKS 
AND CARTS STACK UP TO RESTAURANTS ON SANITATION 11 (2014). 
30. Lucci & Gowins, supra note 18. 
31. CITY OF CHI., OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK: LEGIS. DETAILS (May 20, 2015), https://
chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1804150&GUID=203DE101-08DC-4A0D-A286-
ECBF17509F8F  [https://perma.cc/5SLE-5K7H]. 
32. CITY OF CHI., OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK: LEGIS. DETAILS (Sept. 24, 2015), https://
chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2321146&GUID=14EB1A4A-849A-4502-B254-
E9D19E6EADF0  [https://perma.cc/7JZ9-6DD6]. 
33. Id. 
34. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE 4-8-036(a)(2) (1990). 
35. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE 4-5-010(15) (1990) (amended Dec. 14, 2016). 
36. Chicago Data Portal: Business Licenses, CITY OF CHI., https://data.cityofchicago.org/
Community-Economic-Development/Business-Licenses-Current-Active/uupf-x98q [https:// 
perma.cc/62DB-XYTC] (using the “Business Activity” filter with the following language: “Sales of 
Previously Prepared Food That is Enclosed or Wrapped in Individual Portions From a Mobile Food 
Vehicle”). 
37. Id. 
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rented a space to build out as their own shared kitchen, which takes capital and 
expertise that they do not have, and City Council lowered the total licensing fees for 
a cart and a shared kitchen user license to one hundred dollars.38 
II. REASONS TO CAMPAIGN FOR LEGALIZATION OR WHY NOT LEAVE WELL 
ENOUGH ALONE? 
An activist’s or reformer’s first question must necessarily be, “What is the 
problem that I will invest resources to solve?” Before attempting to intervene in the 
delicate equilibrium (such as it is) of the shadow economy, one should explore 
whether it is a needed and important intervention. In this Part, I will explore reasons 
to intervene in the system that leaves sidewalk vendors in the shadows of the 
economy, without a license or any way to get on the books. 
A. Dignity and Desire 
The most fundamental reason for me to campaign for legalization was the fact 
that vendors asked me to. The leaders of a vendors association, centered in the 
neighborhood of Little Village where many vendors operate, contacted me to tell 
me about their plight and ask for my assistance. Many vendors in Little Village had 
received tickets for selling without a license; they had appeared in administrative 
hearings and received varying fines. They had been told that there was no license 
for them to obtain. More poignant still, several tamale vendors had been arrested. I 
heard the story of a woman who was arrested for selling her homemade tamales 
from a table in front of her home. When her teenager asked why the officer was 
arresting her, the fifteen-year-old was arrested too. 
The stories of arrested tamale vendors are revealing. In an interview captured 
on film, Claudia Perez tells how police officers gestured dismissively toward  
the food she made by hand before the sun rose and said, “Throw away all  
this . . . garbage.” “How can you call food ‘garbage?’” she asks and adds, “I cried 
hard.”39 The treatment of her hard work was demeaning and hurtful. The insult to 
her food is an insult to her skills, her cleanliness, and her labor. Echoing Perez’s 
narrative, a vendor in Los Angeles said that the police “pick us up and move us, just 
like bits of trash.”40 The penalties for their hard work are an indignity. 
The gruff enforcement described only compounds the indignity of the 
illegality itself. Outlawing the sale of food from carts denies people’s freedom to 
 
38. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-5-010, 4-8-041 (amended Dec. 14, 2016) (provided in CITY OF 
CHI., OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK: LEGIS. DETAILS 16 (Feb. 24, 2017), https://chicago.legistar.com/
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2908291&GUID=1E650B27-A1C7-4EC5-8BB6-A20EC5BCFF8A& 
Options=Advanced&Search=  [https://perma.cc/PZ5D-QHYX]). 
39. Ill. Pol’y Inst., Una Mujer y Su Carrito, YOUTUBE (Feb. 13, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=bajmdHt-Dyc  [https://perma.cc/7HRK-B6LK]. 
40. Gregg W. Kettles, Legal Responses to Sidewalk Vending: The Case of Los Angeles, California, 
in STREET ENTREPRENEURS: PEOPLE, PLACE AND POLITICS IN LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
58, 73 ( John Cross & Alfonso Morales eds., 2007) [hereinafter STREET ENTREPRENEURS] (citations 
omitted). 
Final to Printer_Kregor (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2017  2:49 PM 
460 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:453 
choose how to earn a living using their talents and their time. Freedom to earn a 
living is fundamental to human dignity and autonomy and is a key component of 
the pursuit of happiness.41 Telling people that their livelihood is illegitimate runs the 
risk of conveying to them that they are illegitimate.42 The message is even harsher 
when that livelihood is tied to a cultural identity that is particularly dear to 
immigrants serving food from home in the fashion of home. 
The expressive force of the proscription sends a message that poor people 
without enough money to buy a food truck or set up a restaurant cannot serve 
wholesome or desirable food. No matter how careful and clean they are, they cannot 
get a license without a motor or a building. (Indeed, dozens of vendors in the 
association had taken a food handling class and passed the test, but they were still 
not allowed to sell the food they made from carts.) Their businesses are rejected 
under the guise of a public health rule, without any actual screening or regard for 
the safety of their businesses, leaving the vendors to believe the city assumes the 
vendors themselves are impossibly unclean. 
B. Discrimination and Discretion 
Chicago allows food carts to operate in the park district, in summer festivals, 
and in farmers markets, as well as food trucks to operate on the street, which 
suggests that the businesses can be acceptably safe. There is a puzzling double 
standard that allows the carts so many places but not on sidewalks. It is natural to 
question whether the discrimination against carts on the sidewalk is pretextual. 
In this respect, the ban on food carts on the sidewalks of Chicago is 
reminiscent of the San Francisco ordinance in Yick Wo.43 In that case, the city 
passed an ordinance stating that laundries needed special permission to operate, 
unless they operated in buildings made of brick or stone.44 The commissioners 
could reject an application for any reason or for no reason, and there were no 
grounds to challenge or question their decision.45 The distinction between brick and 
wooden laundries was classist and not particularly tied to fire safety. The 
commissioners granted permits for wooden laundries to white applicants and not 
to Chinese applicants.46 
 
41. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 6 (1999); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, 
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 250 (1980); Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty 
and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1089–90 (2013) (comparing economic 
liberty and occupational choice to the liberty interests protected in Lawrence v. Texas). 
42. In contrast, community members urge cities to legalize vending to “recognize the value” of 
street food and its contributions to the culture. Mark Vallianatos et al., Bringing People to Good Food and 
Good Food to People: Enhancing Food Access Through Transportation and Land Use Policies, UEP 
FACULTY & UEPI STAFF SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2011, at 14. 
43. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357 (1886). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 366. 
46. Id. at 361. 
Final to Printer_Kregor (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2017  2:49 PM 
2017] HOW DO YOU FORMALIZE A TAMALE? 461 
The necessary tendency, if not the specific purpose, of this ordinance, and 
of enforcing it in the manner indicated in the record, is to drive out of 
business all the numerous small laundries, especially those owned by 
Chinese, and give a monopoly of the business to the large institutions 
established and carried on by means of large associated Caucasian capital.47 
A law that disallows the more affordable business structure, like the food cart, 
may well be discriminatory against those with small budgets, especially the 
immigrants and the historically poor. Historically, vendors have often been 
immigrants and have often been restricted and marginalized by the government.48 
Outlawing vendors can be a way to favor the established residents and keep the 
immigrants and the poor out of sight. Indeed, the two major U.S. cities that have 
maintained bans on traditional sidewalk food vendors in recent decades, Los 
Angeles and Chicago, are the two cities with the greatest Mexican populations.49 
In Yick Wo, the Court held that it was unacceptable that the livelihoods of 
laundry operators in San Francisco could be decided arbitrarily by officials, saying 
that the laundry operators were “tenants at will, under the supervisors, of their 
means of living.”50 The Court further stated: 
[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the 
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at 
the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where 
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.51 
Unlike the launderers in Yick Wo, vendors in Chicago could not apply for 
licenses hoping that the officials’ discretion would bend their way. Yet, their fates 
are similarly in the control of an unguided official. In a situation where there is a 
sizable industry operating in the open in the shadow economy, and a law outlaws 
the industry but is only occasionally enforced, there is a de facto grant of extreme 
discretion to the police, which is troubling for the same reasons raised in Yick Wo. 
The ban on food carts is so broad, in the context of a big city where many food 
 
47. Id. at 362. 
48. See, e.g., FARLEY ELLIOT, LOS ANGELES STREET FOOD: A HISTORY FROM TAMALEROS 
TO TACO TRUCKS 19–24 (2015); ANDREW F. SMITH, FOOD AND DRINK IN AMERICAN HISTORY 871 
(2013). 
49. Tanvi Misra, Why Chicago Is Still the No. 2 U.S. City for Mexican Immigrants, CITYLAB 
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2014/10/why-chicago-is-still-the-2-us-city-for-
mexican-immigrants/381304/ [https://perma.cc/RE55-K46E]; see Dennis Romero, Street Vendors 
Generate Half a Billion Dollars for L.A.’s Economy, Report Says, L.A. WEEKLY ( June 25, 2015),  
http://www.laweekly.com/news/street-vendors-generate-half-a-billion-dollars-for-las-economy-
report-says-5727233  [https://perma.cc/2EA3-DQR3]. 
50. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368. 
51. Id. at 370. The Court has not maintained the position in Yick Wo that the freedom to earn 
a living free of arbitrary or discriminatory restrictions is a fundamental liberty interest. Rather, it has 
deferred to legislatures and applied only the rational basis test. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 
488 (1955). Yet, the work that we do is fundamentally tied to our human dignity, as well as our 
autonomy and identity. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 250 
(1980); Raynor, supra note 41, at 1089–90 (comparing economic liberty and occupational choice to the 
liberty interests protected in Lawrence v. Texas). 
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carts do operate, that it gives law enforcement the power to act arbitrarily and 
discriminatorily.52 The authority of the police to jail some people for trying to earn 
a living and to destroy their businesses, not because their individual business 
practices fail to comply with health and safety standards, but rather because the law 
is so broad that police can arrest any vendor on a whim, is the kind of unfettered 
discretion that defies an old-fashioned notion of the rule of law. 
It is clear that giving and enforcing these notices may, and quite likely will, 
bring ruin to the business of those against whom they are directed, while 
others, from whom they are withheld, may be actually benefited by what 
is thus done to their neighbors; and, when we remember that this action 
or non-action may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal 
or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives 
easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, it becomes 
unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of being 
brought under cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to 
everyone who gives to the subject a moment’s consideration. In fact, an 
ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power hardly falls 
within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it 
inoperative and void.53 
In fact, in Chicago’s neighborhood of Little Village, one police district 
commander and one officer did target street vendors, especially tamale vendors, 
while vendors in other districts operated without tickets or trouble.54 The power of 
a police officer to act out of enmity or prejudice was absolute. And that power could 
drive vendors out of their livelihoods. Though vendors in many neighborhoods 
operated without reproach, the story of Little Village demonstrated that they were 
all vulnerable to a change in leadership or law enforcement strategy.55 Without the 
law to protect them, they were at the mercy of discretion. Legalizing sidewalk 
vending was a strategy to restore the rule of law and allow vendors who met health 
requirements to ply their trade, regardless of the prejudices or vendettas of the local 
 
52. KATHLEEN STAUDT, FREE TRADE? INFORMAL ECONOMIES AT THE U.S.–MEXICO 
BORDER 152 (1998) (describing how police enforced vending ordinances against Latino people only); 
cf. William J. Stuntz, Terry and Substantive Law, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1362, 1365 (2012) (describing how 
enforcement of drug laws leaves room for the police’s broad discretion and, as a result, discrimination). 
53. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373 (quoting City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217 (1878)). 
54. Vendors told me that the officer who consistently ticketed or questioned vendors in Little 
Village even ticketed a tamale vendor who was sitting in a Dunkin Donuts drinking a cup of coffee.  
Cf. John C. Cross & Marina Karides, Capitalism, Modernity, and the “Appropriate” Use of Space, in 
STREET ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 40, at 19, 20 (describing police officer’s varied responses to street 
vendors). 
55. See Ginny Browne et al., “Keep Your Wheels On”: Mediating Informality in the Food Cart 
Industry, in THE INFORMAL AMERICAN CITY: BEYOND TACO TRUCKS AND DAY LABOR 257–58 
(Vinit Mukhija & Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris eds., 2014) (“Portland’s vendors have benefited also 
from a supportive public and a tolerant approach to enforcement. However, these soft forms of 
regulation, not codified in law, are subject to change with the whims of the public and administrators, 
and could easily shift to constrain rather than support food carts.”). 
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police officer. Legalizing sidewalk vending was a strategy to protect the fundamental 
liberty to earn a living under the same rules that apply to others in the industry. 
The street vendors association operating in Little Village had tried to negotiate 
with the police, and the police in the district did agree not to ticket fruteros, but the 
police would not grant amnesty to the tamalleros. Vendors wanted to change the law 
so that they could get a license.56 They wanted the dignity and security and equality 
that a license would represent.57 And I tried to help achieve that goal. 
C. Economic Development Interests 
Legalizing sidewalk vending, so that vendors who met health and safety 
requirements could obtain licenses to operate, had potential for significant 
economic benefits for individuals, neighborhoods, and the city, as well as 
protections for vendors’ liberty interests. 
Entrepreneurs in the shadow economy stay small. As John Cross points out, 
drawing heavily from Hernando de Soto, shadow entrepreneurs must weigh the 
costs of evading law enforcement against the costs of penalties if they are caught.58 
In our example, vendors in Little Village would regularly shut down their stands and 
lose business during the morning hours when the police officer who targeted them 
was on the beat. But they took the risk of operating in the open during other hours 
and sometimes received tickets with $50 to $500 fines (plus a day of lost earnings 
during the appearance at a hearing) or, as mentioned above, even arrests. 
Sometimes, law enforcement forces shadow entrepreneurs to move away from 
locations that are best for business.59 They cannot risk investing heavily in the 
business.60 Indeed, in a survey of vendors in Chicago that asked about the biggest 
impediment to their businesses, 45% answered legality and 36% answered law-
enforcement harassment.61 Seventy-nine percent said they would expand their 
businesses if they were legal.62 Growing businesses would create jobs, circulate 
money in the local economy, and generate tax revenues.63 
 
56. In a survey of vendors in Los Angeles, 50% of vendors said they would pay up to $100 for 
a permit if one were available; 16% said they would pay for a permit “no matter its cost”; only 4% said 
they would not pay for a permit. Vallianatos et al., supra note 42, at 11. 
57. Vallianatos, A More Delicious City: How to Legalize Street Food, in THE INFORMAL 
AMERICAN CITY, supra note 55, at 218 (“The desire for a permit by most surveyed vendors is notable. 
Allowing vendors to transition to legal sales would help relieve them of the stress of facing inspectors, 
confiscation of their vehicles, and fines.”). 
58. CROSS, supra note 5, at 32–34. 
59. Lucci & Gowins, supra note 18, at 11; see also Hannah Palmer Egan, The Illegal Underground 
Economy Behind Churros, THE VILLAGE VOICE ( July 20, 2013), http://www.villagevoice.com/
restaurants/the-illegal-underground-economy-behind-churros-6438892 [https://perma.cc/D9C4-
EXSF] (describing multiple arrests of churro vendors in New York). 
60. CROSS, supra note 5, at 34. 
61. Lucci & Gowins, supra note 18, at 10. 
62. Id. at 12. 
63. Id.; Browne et al., supra note 55, at 248–49 (describing how the Portland government’s 
interpretation of the law to allow food carts has made it possible for vending “to be a successful 
economic development tool, providing jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities to those with limited 
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In addition, permitting vendors to flourish would encourage many other 
public goods. It would open the opportunity for small businesses to sell groceries 
and wholesome prepared meals at affordable prices in neighborhoods that have few 
large-scale grocery stores.64 
Legal sidewalk vending can also improve the vitality and walkability of 
cities by giving people a reason to walk and be outside. Increasing the 
number of people on city sidewalks can also make neighborhoods safer by 
ensuring more eyes on the street, and may have a positive spillover effect 
on local stores as more people are out strolling and shopping.65 
Legalizing an affordable business model would allow for more diversity among 
entrepreneurs and would create more consumer choice. “Street and mobile food 
also reflect the region’s cultural diversity and have become an increasingly popular 
way for residents of all backgrounds to sample diverse cuisines and to experience a 
vibrant street scene.”66 In particular, entrepreneurs who would not operate illegally 
might join the industry after legalization and start promising new businesses.67 
Vendors operating in the shadow economy are often people who are not able to 
find other acceptable work, often due to discrimination: poor people, immigrants, 
women, and people of color.68 For want of alternatives, they may be willing to 
accept the constraints and indignities of operating against the law. But if the city 
legalized the business model, other creative entrepreneurs might view it as an 
opportunity to start a small business that reaches urban customers face to face and 
conducts very affordable market research for new recipes or a new concept. 
For one example, an entrepreneur named Sara Travis had a business plan for 
a vending business in Chicago.69 She had commissioned designers to construct a 
bicycle trailer equipped with kegs from which a vendor could dispense iced coffee 
or iced tea.70 She planned to have a fleet of the bicycles selling throughout the city.71 
Because the city had no license or body of regulations for the business, and because 
there was no assurance that the investment in growing the business in Chicago 
would be secure, the entrepreneur moved her business to Austin, Texas.72 If 
Chicago had adopted a license structure for nonmotorized vendors quickly, the 
 
resources”); cf. Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barriers Facing 
Producers of “Local Foods,” 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 49, 98 (2011) (describing the economic 
benefits of food sales in farmers markets). 
64. Vallianatos, supra note 57, at 218. 
65. Id. 
66. Vallianatos et al., supra note 42, at 21. 
67. Cross & Karides, supra note 54, at 30. 
68. Manuel Castells & Alejandro Portes, World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects 
of the Informal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 26 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., 1989); Larson, supra note 1, at 141. 
69. Entrepreneur: Sara Travis’ Brew Hub, Interview by Bill Moller with Sara Travis, WGN  
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Brew Hub might have created jobs and revenues and a spark of innovation in the 
city. It might have even been a major corporate citizen someday. 
Opening a city to entrepreneurs with plans for mobile food without a motor 
makes economic sense. It allows more people to give business a try. It allows people 
to test the market with their recipes and services. It allows people to spend and earn 
money locally. It allows a few businesses to start small and eventually grow big. Our 
campaign to legalize food carts was a campaign to build the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem in Chicago. 
III. CHALLENGES AND RISKS OF LEGALIZATION STRATEGY 
A campaign to legalize street vendors is tortuously fraught. Unlike a campaign 
to deregulate an occupation or industry so entrepreneurs have more flexibility and 
freedom to operate or innovate, a legalization campaign is in essence a campaign to 
regulate. There is no practical hope that the government will grant legal amnesty to 
unregulated preparation and service of food, even if they decline to enforce the laws 
against street vendors for the most part. Activists advocating for legalization must 
be sensitive to the possible negative effects that the regulation might have (and 
where it might make no difference at all) for the lives of vendors in the shadow 
economy. 
If the rule of law requires that all businesses meet the same standards of health 
precautions and equipment specifications, and that the law be enforced equally 
against all people, the rule of law is awfully tough on poor and marginalized 
people.73 It may not in the end provide them with dignity and legitimacy but rather 
taunt them with unattainable standards. Meanwhile, the amnesty that they might 
desire would legalize substandard, dangerous businesses. This is what Larson calls 
the conundrum of informality.74 “[U]nder conditions of economic inequality, do 
ambitious and absolute regulatory standards advance or frustrate social justice?”75 
And she points out that American lawyers are ill-equipped to deal with the 
confounding problem.76 
Regulation imposes a cost on all businesses, but the cost can be unbearable 
for microbusinesses or individuals operating without strong networks or 
resources.77 Indeed, the costs of compliance are often the reasons that businesses 
operate in the shadow economy in the first place. Building up a set of regulations 
will not, on its own, allow entrepreneurs to move out of the shadow economy into 
the formal economy. “[U]nless the legislation can be implemented, it is doing no 
 
73. Larson, supra note 1, at 144 (“To hold to formal equality in economic regulatory standards 
and enforcement will harshly burden those already hardest pressed to survive the new economic 
order.”). 
74. Id. at 143. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 159. 
77. Richard Epstein, The Moral and Practical Dilemmas of an Underground Economy, 103 YALE 
L.J. 2157, 2165 (1994). 
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more than encouraging civil disobedience.”78 And it might destroy some informal 
businesses if they tried to convert.79 
Health and safety regulations for food businesses are particularly complicated 
and costly, and they are difficult to eliminate.80 At the barest minimum, Chicago 
would require food to be prepared in an inspected, licensed facility, whereas almost 
all vendors in the shadow economy prepare their food in their home kitchens.81 The 
cost of renting time in a commercial facility that meets all the myriad requirements 
of a commercial kitchen could put vendors out of business. Here is a striking and 
realistic assessment: 
As one would-be cake baker in Texas noted: Say you are making a $50 cake, 
which most people consider to be a lot for a birthday cake. It takes you 
three hours to make the cake and you pay $15 an hour for the kitchen. 
How does that work out? It doesn’t. You end up owing money on every 
cake you make.82 
If the regulations of food vendors are unaffordable for the vendors currently 
operating in the shadow economy, they are still faced with a choice between 
noncompliance and exit. In other words, they are in no different situation than they 
are when there is no license at all. 
Even more discouraging to the activist or public interest lawyer with an eye 
toward reform, there is a risk that unlicensed vendors would be in a worse situation 
with a license framework on the books than when their businesses were flatly illegal. 
It is possible that a new law passed with the imprimatur of the current legislature 
would give law enforcement a clearer directive to enforce the law. The police might 
not be so fractured in their approach to the vendors, and they might not be 
sympathetic to vendors who could get a license but did not.83 In a case like ours, 
where the legislation passed covers only some vendors because the workable 
lobbying strategy was to take an incremental approach, then some vendors might 
 
78. Claire Moore Dickerson, Informal-Sector Entrepreneurs, Development and Formal Law: A 
Functional Understanding of Business Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 179, 208 (2011). 
79. John C. Cross & Alfonso Morales, Introduction: Locating Street Markets in the 
Modern/Postmodern World, in STREET ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 40, at 1, 9 (“Policy designed to 
develop the informal sector tends to ignore or minimize the potential or the benefits of street merchants 
and underestimate the difficulties of making micro-businesses bear the development burden of formal 
enterprises . . . . [T ]hey potentially undermine the very factors that make many informal enterprises 
successful while imposing formal rules that they are unable to deal with. From engaging in a flexible 
and evolving economic activity focused on family subsistence needs (and often involving the avoidance 
of control by authorities), they are sucked into a rigid set of rules that they can barely understand and 
even less likely to be able to challenge or manipulate. While their businesses may be more ‘accountable’ 
they may in fact be less successful.”); CROSS, supra note 5, at 3 (“[I]t was often their ability to avoid 
regulations and the payment of taxes and fees that made people in the informal economy profitable, 
and this seemed to pose a political and moral dilemma: They were surviving largely because they were 
breaking the rules.”). 
80. Nina W. Tarr, Food Entrepreneurs and Food Safety Regulation, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 35 
(2011). 
81. Id. 
82. Johnson & Endres, supra note 63, at 108. 
83. Cross & Karides, supra note 54, at 20. 
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be in the worst possible situation where enforcement is harsher, but they have no 
way yet to obtain a license to protect themselves. 
Finally, there is the concern that vendors who do try to comply with the rules 
and obtain licenses will still be cited and fined and harassed and constrained in their 
growth. The registration of vendors could make them easy to find, and the rules 
they could violate would multiply.84 Instead of a citation for vending without a 
license, vendors could be cited for multiple violations if they break rules about 
where, when, and how to vend.85 Sidewalk vendors in New York City, many of 
whom have licenses, are ticketed all the time, especially for violations of 
administrative rules about where they can be and for how long.86 Indeed, the tickets 
for administrative or spatial violations outnumber the tickets for violations of the 
health code three to one.87 If the costs of enforcement are as high or higher after 
getting a license, vendors will still try to evade law enforcement and they will not 
invest in the business, either in growth or in the equipment and safeguards required 
to get a license.88 
If the well-resourced entrepreneurs, who did not operate as vendors when it 
could be done only in the shadow economy, are the only ones who can survive after 
legalization, then many of the goals of legalization are thwarted. “One of the great 
challenges of formalization is that it can displace the most vulnerable residents of 
an informal settlement. . . . [F]ormalization can be a moment when inequality is 
deepened.”89 
Scholars have argued that activists and reformers should focus efforts on 
minimizing the enforcement of regulatory standards on entrepreneurs in the 
shadow economy, rather than on trying to change the laws.90 They praise 
development experts and economists who understand “that the informal sector is a 
healthy and adaptive response to existing realities.” Meanwhile, they deride those 
who engage in “magical thinking” by indulging a belief “that a government can 
create an effective legal system by merely waving the legislative wand.”91 Yet, 
entrepreneurs in the informal economy are highly vulnerable in the absence of a 
 
84. STAUDT, supra note 52, at 153 (“The newly invented arrangement offered striking 
surveillance capabilities, should the police use their time to monitor compliance.”). 
85. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–
23 (2001) (explaining how prosecutors’ ability to “stack” charges for overlapping crimes alarmingly 
increases their leverage over defendants). 
86. Gregg Kettles, Crystals, Mud, and Space: Street Vending Informality, in THE INFORMAL 
AMERICAN CITY, supra note 55, at 227, 229. 
87. Id. at 237. 
88. CROSS, supra note 5, at 34. 
89. Ananya Roy, Urban Informality: Toward an Epistemology of Planning, 71 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 
147, 153 (2005). 
90. CROSS, supra note 5, at 60. 
91. Dickerson, supra note 78, at 182–83. 
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legal path, and many potential entrepreneurs will opt out of creating jobs because 
they are unwilling to invest in such uncertain circumstances.92 
IV. STRATEGY FOR LEGALIZATION 
For a legalization campaign to be successful meeting the goals set forth in Part 
II, as well as addressing the challenges set forth in Part III, the cost-benefit package 
of having a license has to make sense for the entrepreneurs who currently operate 
in the informal economy, as well as new entrants. Compliance has to be affordable 
and workable for entrepreneurs formerly in the shadow economy if the reform  
is to provide them the dignity, security, potential, and opportunity of converting  
to the formal economy. Here I will present some (hopefully) practical 
recommendations and strategies for designing such a campaign. 
First, the regulations of the business must be minimal, so as not to impose 
unnecessary costs on compliance.93 The license fee should be as low as possible and 
reformers should urge the lawmakers to consider the package of costs that license 
applicants must afford. In Chicago, the City Council helpfully lowered fees after 
recognizing the initial package was too costly. While the ordinance that was initially 
introduced set a license fee of $100, equal to the license fee for a peddler’s license,94 
the ordinance that passed set the license fee at $350.95 Vendors who wished to 
prepare their own food in a shared commercial kitchen also faced the cost of a 
shared kitchen user license, with a fee of $330.96 There is some uncertainty whether 
every shared kitchen user must also have a certified sanitation manager on staff.97 
The training, materials, and test for that certificate also usually cost around $200.98 
Even after spending the money, many members of the Little Village vendors 
association have struggled to pass the test, given their limited schooling and literacy. 
With licensure costs approaching $1000, even before accounting for upgrades to 
carts and rent for a shared kitchen space, legality was an overwhelming expense for 
 
92. Larson, supra note 1, at 177 (quoting SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND MONEY 166 (1998)). 
93. STAUDT, supra note 52, at 153 (describing a reform measure that increased the start-up costs 
for vendors by ten times). 
94. Chi., Ill., Mun. Code Ordinance No. O2014-4212, 2014 Chi. City Council  (Ill. 2014),  
https://chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1804150&GUID=203DE101-08DC-4A0D-
A286-ECBF17509F8F&Options=Advanced&Search [https://perma.cc/7Q4H-VHTL] (failed to 
pass). 
95. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-8-010, 7-38-130, 7-38-140. 
96. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-5-010(15) (amended Dec. 14, 2016).. 
97. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-8-039(e)(3) (1990) (“At all times that potentially hazardous food 
is being prepared, tasted, handled, packaged, prepared for storage, served or otherwise used at a shared 
kitchen by a shared kitchen user, such shared kitchen user shall have on site at the shared kitchen a 
person who holds a current sanitation certificate issued by the department of health.”). 
98. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, AM. ACADEMY OF FOOD SAFETY, http://
www.aafoodsafety.com/faq.html [https://perma.cc/NHH5-LHXB] (last visited Sept. 16, 2016); 
ServSafe Food Service Sanitation Manager Certification & Renewal, ILL. RESTAURANT ASS’N, http://
www.illinoisrestaurants.org/?page=SanitationCertif [https://perma.cc/7FC7-WHN3] (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2016). 
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many low-income entrepreneurs. Because licensure is not a guaranteed exemption 
from tickets and citations in the future (because, for example, some officials have 
told vendors they may not stay in place for any certain length of time), the cost is 
particularly discouraging. If a goal of reform is converting vendors from the 
informal economy to the formal economy, the price of conversion should be lower. 
Accordingly, Chicago lowered the cart license fee and waived the shared kitchen 
user license fee for vendors, so both licenses now cost $100.99  
In addition, regulatory requirements for vendors should be focused only on 
ensuring health and safety rather than placing extra burdens on entrepreneurs in the 
name of aesthetics or market engineering. Regulations that are not tied to such 
crucial public purposes raise questions about why they are there in the first place. 
As in Yick Wo, vendors might conclude that they are pretextual and are put in place 
for an improper purpose, such as protectionism or prejudice.100 Vendors might get 
the sense that the law is there simply to present them with unattainable standards 
or to squeeze them out. Laws that reasonably require basic health standards are 
more likely to accrue respect for the rule of law. 
If the new regulations avoid the nitty-gritty laws about where vendors can 
operate and focus on the health code, then it is quite possible that the costs of 
harassment will be low. Gregg Kettles analyzed over 100,000 citations issued to 
vendors in New York City and found that law enforcement is much more likely to 
cite people for violating “crystal” rules than “mud” rules and much more likely to 
cite people for violating spatial rules than health rules.101 Vending laws that simply 
hold vendors to standards that they are safe, sanitary, and wholesome will hold them 
to the standard of care that we want to apply to all food businesses without giving 
law enforcement easy hooks for tickets. 
This approach has the added benefit of being the constitutional one. The 
government should employ its police power and limit people’s economic liberty 
only in the public interest. Courts can and should strike down laws that restrict 
people’s ability to earn a living without any tie to a legitimate, public purpose.102 
Lobbying successfully for simple regulations focused exclusively on food 
safety can be a challenge. Special interest groups might fight for caps or spatial rules 
or time limits out of protectionist or prejudiced motivations.103 Meanwhile, the 
 
99.   CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-8-041(c), 4-5-010(15) (amended Dec. 14, 2016). 
100. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373. 
101. Kettles, Crystals, Mud, and Space: Street Vending Informality, in THE INFORMAL 
AMERICAN CITY, supra note 55, at 235. 
102. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2013); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 
F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 2002); People v. Ala Carte Catering Co., 98 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 9 (1979) 
(holding that a requirement that food trucks be 100 feet away from a restaurant entrance violated 
Fourteenth Amendment); Order Following Demurrer Hearing, People v. Garcia, Case No 8EA05884, 
*7 (Cal. Supp. filed Aug. 27, 2008) (“Garcia Order”) (holding that time limits on food trucks were 
arbitrary as related to public safety and wholly lacking a rational basis as required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
103. Regina Austin, “An Honest Living”: Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and the Black 
Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2121–22 (1993). 
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consumers who ought to care about food safety as well as diversity of choice are 
unlikely to participate in the political process that shapes the ordinance. 
Activists can try to provide information to lawmakers and policymakers that 
support a light touch for regulation. They can harness the grassroots lobbying power 
of the consumers through petition campaigns and public media. Stories abound of 
cities’ efforts to over-regulate vendors and the failures that ensued;104 they should 
be wielded as cautionary tales. And the lure of revenue from license fees and taxes 
should be clearly conditioned on regulations that make formalization affordable.105 
Some health and safety regulations are unavoidable. The question becomes 
how to make them affordable. Larson suggests an approach of regularization, in 
which the law requires everyone to do the most he can toward safety standards.106 
Regularization has the advantage of uniformity—the same law applies to 
everyone—while giving poor people the permission to do only what they can 
manage. It also moves people gradually toward full compliance, with the assumption 
that they will continue to improve safety features as they spend what they can afford 
each year. 
Regularization is hard to square with health requirements for businesses, 
particularly food businesses. Larson does not specify how officials would figure out 
the proper percentage of assets that constitutes one’s “realistic capacity” to make 
one’s home safe.107 That would be difficult to do, but it is likely even harder to do 
in the context of entrepreneurship. We assume that people need housing, but we 
do not assume that people need to be self-employed. We might accept that people 
do the best they can for themselves, but we might reasonably determine that there 
is a threshold level of food safety that we require of people who are selling food to 
others. 
Larson’s legal specification for regularization is impractical in the context of 
underground food businesses, but it is useful to think of legal structures that would 
allow people to start small and with a lower standard of regulatory compliance. Such 
laws would form a background context that could make the formalization of 
businesses more plausible. 
 
104. See, e.g., Nate Berg, How to Stop the Over-Regulation of Street Vendors, THE ATLANTIC CITY 
LAB ( June 12, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/work/2012/06/enabling-street-vendors-become-
small-businesses/2254/ [https://perma.cc/XS2E-X6JN]; Controversy Erupts Over Regulating Mobile 
Food Vendors, ENID NEWS & EAGLE (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.enidnews.com/news/controversy-
erupts-over-regulating-mobile-food-vendors/article_fe184bc8-c2ef-11e4-9ef0-af2de944a239.html 
[https://perma.cc/8W7Q-7PKZ]. 
105. This strategy might have an added advantage of sowing sympathy for vendors in the minds 
of policymakers (or at least a healthy respect or fear of public relations problems if they are perceived 
as harsh). Even if explicit amnesty is not feasible, policymakers may provide flexibility and a grace 
period so vendors can comply with new regulations. Chicago officials have communicated that they 
will wait to enforce the new law against vendors so that they have time to comply. I am unaware of 
citations for violations of the new law after six months. 
106. Larson, supra note 1, at 180. 
107. Id. 
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There are examples and models for regulatory structures that lessen the costs 
of regulatory compliance for small businesses or service to the poor, even in the 
realm of sensitive areas of public health and safety. Cottage food laws allow people 
to prepare nonhazardous foods in their home kitchens, often capped by a limit on 
the revenues they can make there.108 These laws allow people to start small and push 
them to move to inspected kitchens with commercial-grade equipment only if they 
reach some level of success.109 There is evidence that the relaxed health standards 
do result in more businesses (or at least more registered businesses).110 Some states 
similarly eliminate or reduce regulatory burdens on food service operations run out 
of houses of worship, especially related to soup kitchens.111 Analogies can be drawn 
to home-based day cares, which do not have to meet all the same building 
requirements as day cares in commercial locations. 
Even if states or municipalities refuse to sanction preparation of hazardous 
foods in home kitchens, they might allow food businesses to prepare food in 
existing community kitchens without applying all the same requirements of a 
commercial kitchen. One supervisor with the proper training and sanitation 
certificate could oversee the activities of multiple vendors, so that each vendor 
would not have to pass a rigorous test. Rent would be more affordable to use a 
kitchen that was not so expensive to build out and license, and the requirement 
might move food preparation out of home kitchens where there are pets and 
residents who are disconnected from the business. If the legislature wants to push 
businesses toward higher standards as they grow, the permission could be granted 
only for kitchen users of a certain size or only for nonmotorized vendors. The 
measure would help entrepreneurs transition gradually to the formal economy. 
One of the most affordable small kitchens might be the cart itself. Reformers 
should push lawmakers to allow preparation of food on the cart. Chicago’s 
incremental approach, allowing the sale of pre-packaged food only, exacerbates the 
cost of compliance. When all the corn and mayo and butter and cheese and pepper 
(the ingredients for elotes) must be mixed and packaged in advance, vendors have to 
pay more for rent in a shared kitchen, pay more for packaging, and lose more money 
in waste because they cannot prepare the food to the customer’s order. Indeed, food 
 
108. ALLI CONDRA, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FOOD LAW AND POLICY CLINIC, COTTAGE 
FOOD LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 14–15 (Aug. 2013), http://www.chlpi.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/12/FINAL_Cottage-Food-Laws-Report_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEM9-
H5GW]. For a helpful digest of cottage food laws around the country, see Cottage Food Laws, 
FORRAGER.COM, http://forrager.com/laws/ [https://perma.cc/WEZ8-545B] (last visited Sept. 16, 
2016). 
109. Id. 
110. Is Lemonade Legal? Testing the Limits of Silliness in East Texas, THE ECONOMIST ( July 11, 
2015), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21657409-testing-limits-silliness-east-texas-
lemonade-legal [https://perma.cc/YF4U-YRKD]. 
111. See, e.g., 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (2012) (exempting churches from retail food 
establishment license requirements); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-36 (2015) (exempting volunteer-based 
soup kitchens); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 143-A:5-a (1995) (allowing for a license exemption for soup 
kitchens). 
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preparation at the cart has added health benefits. The food is fresher, and the 
customer can examine the conditions of its preparation more critically than most 
food from a restaurant. If the business is small enough to contain its inventory and 
food preparation activities on the cart, it should be allowed to do so. 
Finally, after lobbying for laws that make compliance workable for poor 
vendors, activists and reformers can help the vendors comply. The legal changes 
will not be enough to allow vendors to succeed, and they may even make survival 
harder at first. But communities and collectives can join forces to build the 
resources that vendors will need. In Chicago, the vendors association has begun to 
plan for its own commercial kitchen and its own program to assist vendors in 
obtaining licenses. If regulators are accepting of creative new approaches to build 
safe kitchens, then the change in the law will finally be worth celebrating. 
CONCLUSION 
Laws that broadly outlaw honest entrepreneurship in its most affordable forms 
are degrading to vulnerable people and foolishly limiting for the economy. Yet, the 
path for public interest lawyers and activists advocating for entrepreneurs’ 
economic liberty can be tricky. By focusing on real people whose livelihoods are on 
the line, we can design a strategy for law reform that is workable. To allow vendors 
to transition successfully to the formal economy, fees must be low, regulations must 
be limited to issues related to health and safety, and options for microbusinesses to 
start in spaces without all the refinement of restaurant kitchens must be available. 
 
